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1	 Introduction
1.1 Origin of the Business Judgment Rule
The Business Judgment Rule (BJR) has its origin 
in US company law, dating back to the 1800s.1 The 
first mentioning of what is now generally known as 
BJR is found in Louisiana’s Supreme Court decision 
Percy v. Millaudon.2 Other early cases establishing 
the BJR are Godbold v. Branch Bank,3 an 1847 Ala-
bama Supreme Court decision, and Hodges v. New 
England Screw Co.4 In the latter, the court stated: 
“We think a board of directors acting in good faith 
and with reasonable care and diligence, who never-
theless fall into a mistake, either as to law or fact, 
are not liable for the consequences of such mistake.”5 
This judgment clearly recognizes human fallibility. 
As long as directors perform their responsibilities 
dutifully and decide in good faith, they shall not be 
personally held liable for the outcome of business 
decisions. In addition, these early judgments empha-
sized the reasonable diligence and care demanded 
from directors during their performance of duties.6 
Thus, originally the BJR was not intended as a de-
fence precluding judicial inquiry into the procedures 
and methodologies applied by the directors when 
making entrepreneurial decisions. In fact, the BJR 
was only the starting point for inquiry into the direc-
tor’s decision-making process.
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1 ARSHT, S. The business Judgement Rule Revisited. 
Hofstra Law Review [online]. 1979-1980, Vol. 8, Iss. 1, 
Article 6, p. 93-134. Available at: http://scholarlycom-
mons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol8/iss1/6
2 Percy v. Millaudon, 8 Mart. (n.s.) 68, 74 f, 78 (La. 
1829).
3 Godbold v. Branch Bank, 11 Ala. 191 (1847).
4 Hodges v. New England Screw Co, 3 R. I. 9 (1853).
5 Hodges v. New England Screw Co, 3 R. I. 9, 18 
(1853).
6 ARSHT, S., 1979. Ibid, p. 100.
1.2 Content and Rationales of the Business 
Judgment Rule
The current case law by Delaware courts describes 
the BJR as the “presumption that in making a business 
decision the directors of a corporation acted on an in-
formed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief 
that the action taken was in the best interests of the 
company.”7 Although the BJR is considered “one of 
the least understood concepts in the entire corporate 
field,”8 certain core statements are generally accepted. 
The directors’ acting must be independent and disin-
terested as to the matter acted upon and they must 
act with due care and in good faith.9 This due care 
inquiry is process-orientated and the standard of due 
care is measured by gross negligence.10 Furthermore, 
the burden of proof is borne by the party challenging 
the directors’ decision; he or she has to establish facts 
rebutting the presumption.11 These parts form the 
BJR’s pronounced procedural dimension. Additional-
ly, the BJR also has a substantive force. If the plaintiff 
fails to rebut the BJR the court will not substitute its 
views for those of the directors’ if the latter’s decision 
can be “attributed to any rational business purpose.”12 
The result of this approach, especially with the pre-
sumption in favour of directors combined with the 
burden of proof, is that plaintiffs rarely succeed win-
ning duty of care cases in the US.13
The rationales underlying the BJR fall into three 
main categories:14 (a) encouragement of directors 
to serve and take risks, (b) avoidance of judicial en-
7 Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 2 Exc. 28 (Del. 
1984).
8 JOHNSON, L.P.Q. Corporate Officers and the Bu-
siness Judgment Rule. The Business Lawyer [online]. 
2005, Vol. 60, p. 439 (p. 454); MANNE, H.G., Our Two 
Corporation Systems: Law and Economics. Viriginia 
Law Review [online]. 1967, Vol. 53, No. 2, pp. 259-284, 
(p. 270).
9 Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000).
10 Cede & Co v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 364 
(Del. 1993); Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 873 
(Del. 1985).
11 Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812.
12 Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 264.
13 JOHNSON, L.P.Q., 2005. Ibid, p. 455 with further 
references.
14 JOHNSON, L.P.Q., 2005. Ibid, p. 455 ff.
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croachment into business decisions, and (c) retain-
ing the board of directors as central decision-making 
body in corporate governance. These principles jus-
tify the BJR and are briefly explained as follows:
a Encouraging Directors to Serve and Take 
Risks
Entrepreneurial decisions, even though made by 
competent directors, can in hindsight turn out to 
have been improvident causing the company a loss 
of a significant amount of money.15 If directors could 
be held personally liable for such decisions, rational 
individuals would hesitate to accept or even decline 
a nomination as director. Furthermore, a correlation 
between risk and return is acknowledged. Therefore, 
business decisions which are of greater risk gener-
ally promise higher returns for investors, e.g. share-
holders. However, such decisions might also result 
in higher losses. If directors had to worry about li-
ability for every business decision they make while 
not benefitting from the potential return, they would 
not take the necessary risks. This would not be in the 
shareholders’ interests and reduce the company’s ca-
pability to innovate. As a consequence, it would also 
hinder society’s technological advancement.
b Avoiding Judicial Encroachment into 
Business Decisions
Judges generally are considered not to possess the 
experience, expertise, and information necessary to 
make complex entrepreneurial decisions, due to their 
lack of an economic education and background.16 
Additionally, the so called “hindsight bias” must be 
taken into consideration. This effect describes the 
tendency “to assign an erroneously high probability 
of occurrence to a probabilistic event simply because 
it ended up occurring.”17 Due to the hindsight bias, 
courts would deem loss bringing events as having 
been predictable, although there was hardly any ob-
jective basis on the probability of the event occurred. 
The BJR therefore prevents courts to review business 
decisions with ex post knowledge.
15 BLOCK, D. J., BARTON, N. E., RADIN, S. A. The 
Business Judgment Rule: Fiduciary Duties of Corporate 
Directors and Officers. The Business Lawyer [online]. 
1987, Vol. 42, No. 3, pp. 995-997.
16 Air Line Pilots Association International v. UAL 
Corp., 717 F. Supp. 575, 582 (N.D. Ill. 1989).
17 BAINBRIDGE, Stephen M. The Business Judg-
ment Rule as Abstention Doctrine. UCLA, Law and 
Econ. Research Paper [online]. 2003,School of Law, 
No. 03-18, p. 112. Available at SRN: http://ssrn.com/
abstract=429260
c Directors as Central Decision-Making 
Authorities
Undoubtedly, it is the directors’ duty to direct the 
companies’ fortunes; the board of directors manages 
the business and its affairs. By limiting judicial re-
view using the BJR, the statutory scheme of central-
izing authority in the board of directors is preserved.18 
The ability to effortlessly challenge directors’ deci-
sions judicially would undermine the distribution of 
competences in company law. The ultimate decision-
making authority would be shifted to any sharehold-
er willing to file a complaint.19
2	 Business	Judgment	Rule	in	Austria	
before	its	Codification
2.1 Initial Legal Situation
The Austrian law did not contain any provision ex-
pressly dealing with the BJR previous to January 1st 
2016. Moreover, the Austrian Supreme Court (OGH) 
did not specifically refer to the BJR yet; only in one 
case20 the doctrinal discussion of it was mentioned 
obiter.
However, the courts gave the directors large dis-
cretion for managing business affairs.21 Directors 
violated their duty of care only if they exceeded the 
limits of the allowed discretion grossly.
Furthermore, the principles underlying the pro-
tection of managerial freedom are identical with 
the above-mentioned. This results from the simple 
fact that in Austria business decisions also harbour 
18 DOOLEY, M., VEASEY, E.N. The Role of the Board 
in Derivative Litigation: Delaware Law and the Current 
ALI Proposals Compared, The Business Lawyer [on-
line]. 1989, Vol. 44, No. 2, pp. 503-542 (p. 522).
19 DOOLEY, M. Not in the Corporation’s Best Inte-
rests. In: ABA Journal. 1992, Vol. 78, p. 45.
20 Austrian Supreme Court (OGH), 8. 5. 2008, 
6 Ob 28/08y. In: Der Gesellschafter. 2008, 304 
(SCHMIDT, S.).
21 Austrian Supreme Court (OGH), 26. 02. 2002, 1 Ob 
144/01k. In: Der Gesellschafter. 2002, 86 = wbl 2002, 
325; Austrian Supreme Court (OGH), 22. 05. 2003, 8 
Ob 262/02 s. In: Zeitschrift für Gesellschaftsrecht und 
angrenzendes Steuerrecht. 2003, 441; Austrian Supre-
me Court (OGH), 23. 05. 2007, 3 Ob 59/07h. In: Öste-
rreichische Zeitschrift für Recht und Rechnungswesen. 
2007, 261 (WENGER, T.); Austrian Supreme Court 
(OGH), 11. 06. 2008, 7 Ob 58/08 t. In: Der Gesellschaf-
ter, 2008, 378 (KALSS, S. ZOLLNER, J.); Wohnrechtli-
che Blätter. 2008, 598 (TORGGLER, U.); ecolex. 2008, 
926 (REICH-ROHRWIG, J.).
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potential risks. Consequently, a need for lowering 
the probability of directors’ personal liability exists 
as well. In doctrine, the directors’ leeway in making 
business decisions granted by courts is often equated 
with the BJR.22 In fact, the Austrian and the US ju-
risdiction approach the same challenges, but in a dif-
ferent manner.
2.2 ARAG v. Garmenbeck and its Implications 
for Austria
In the German-speaking civil law countries the 
BJR was not part of Supreme Court judgments un-
til 1997, when the German Supreme Court (BGH) 
ruled in its much-vaunted ARAG v. Garmenbeck23 
decision that a personal liability of executive board 
members presupposes that the boundaries of rea-
sonable business decisions, which have to be solely 
orientated towards the company’s benefit and based 
upon carefully determined facts, are massively ex-
ceeded, or that there is irresponsible hazard instead 
of a merely aggravated risk, or that there are other 
irregularities.24 Although the BGH did not explicitly 
mention the BJR, the judgment was widely regarded 
as implementing it.
Following the doctrine’s demand25 the German 
legislator codified parts of the BJR’s substantive im-
plications in sec. 93 para. 1 German Stock Corpora-
tion Act (dAktG): “In conducting business, the mem-
bers of the management board shall employ the care 
of a diligent and conscientious manager. They shall 
not be deemed to have violated the aforementioned 
duty if, at the time of taking the entrepreneurial deci-
sion, they had good reason to assume that they were 
acting on informed basis of adequate information 
for the benefit of the company. […].” Unfortunately, 
the German codification did not implement the US 
BJR’s procedural aspect, namely shifting the burden 
of proof to the plaintiff. In Germany it’s upon the di-
rectors proving the BJR’s prerequisites and thus hav-
ing acted with due care. Hence, the BJR is consid-
ered to be deprived of its centrepiece.26
22 TOLD, J. Business Judgment Rule und ihre Anwen-
dbarkeit in Österreich. In: Zeitschrift für Gesellschaft-
srecht und angrenzendes Steuerrecht. 2015, p. 663.
23 German Supreme Court (BGH), 21. 04. 1997, II ZR 
175/95, In: NJW. 1997, 1926.
24 The OGH already recognized managerial discretion 
in 1 Ob 179/73. Nonetheless, this decision was only dis-
cussed for its implications on labour law.
25 ULMER, P. Aktionärsklage als Instrument der Kont-
rolle des Vorstands- und Aufsichtsratshandelns. In: Zeit-
schrift für das gesamte Handels- und Wirtschaftsrecht. 
1999, Vol. 163. Pp. 290-342, (p. 299).
26 SCHIMA, G. Unternehmerisches Ermessen und die 
Business Judgment Rule. In: KONECNY, A. Insolvenz-
In Austria, the OGH – in the wake of the ARAG 
v. Garmenbeck decision – adopted the BJR’s compo-
nents in its rulings, e.g. in 3 Ob 34/97i,27 Interconti-
nentale28and Hirsch Servo,29 although the BJR itself 
was not mentioned expressly.30 Based on these judg-
ments the doctrine carved out the following charac-
teristics determining the BJR: It must be (a) an entre-
preneurial decision, (b) taken by directors not guided 
by extraneous interests, (c) in the company’s best in-
terests, (d) on the basis of adequate information, and 
(e) without taking irresponsible hazard.31
a Entrepreneurial Decision
The BJR only applies with regard to entrepre-
neurial decisions, whereas the term entrepreneurial 
has to be interpreted widely.32 In principle all deci-
sions of directors relating to or affecting the com-
pany’s management are covered. The directors’ 
power of discretion is a characteristic for a business 
judgment.33 However, a decision is not considered 
as entrepreneurial if it is determined by law, regu-
lation, articles of association, employment contract 
-Forum 2011 - Vorträge anlässlich des 18. Insolvenz-Fo-
rums Grundlsee im November 2011 [online]. 2012, pp. 
131 – 164, (p. 135). Available at: http://www.ksw.at/file-
admin/user_upload/publikationen/Schima_Unternehme-
risches_Ermessen_und_die_Business_Judgement_Rule.
pdf
27 Austrian Supreme Court (OGH), 4. 06. 1998, 3 Ob 
34/97i. In: SZ. 71/108; ecolex. 1998, 774 (REICH-RO-
HRWIG, J.); Österreichische Zeitschrift für Recht und 
Rechnungswesen. 1999, 37 (WENGER, T.).
28 Austrian Supreme Court (OGH), 26. 02. 2002, 1 Ob 
144/01k. In: Der Gesellschafter. 2002, 86; the findings 
in this decision were expressively upheld in: Austrian 
Supreme Court (OGH), 22. 05. 2003, 8 Ob 262/02 s. In: 
Zeitschrift für Gesellschaftsrecht und angrenzendes Ste-
uerrecht. 2003, 441.
29 Austrian Supreme Court (OGH), 11. 06. 2008, 7 Ob 
58/08 t. In: Der Gesellschafter. 2008/378 (KALSS, S./
ZOLLNER, J.); Wohnrechtliche Blätter. 2008, 598 (TOR-
GGLER, U.); ecolex. 2008, 926 (REICH-ROHRWIG, J.).
30 LUTTER, M. Die Business Judgment Rule in Öste-
rreich und Deutschland. In: Der Gesellschafter. 2007, p. 
79 (p. 85); SCHIMA, G., 2011. Ibid, p. 131.
31 LUTTER, M., 2007. Ibid, p. 81 ff with further 
references.
32 LUTTER, M., 2007. Ibid, p. 81 f.
33 TOLD, J., 2015. Ibid, p. 65; SCHIMA, G. Business 
Judgment Rule und Verankerung im österreichischen 
Recht In: Der Gesellschafter. 2007, Vol. 93, p. 93; KA-
ROLLUS, M. Business Judgment Rule und Handeln auf 
Grundlage angemessener Information am Beispiel des 
Vergleichs über Ansprüche gegen Dritte. In: Festschrift 
Jud. 2012. Pp. 307, 315.
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or shareholder’s or supervisory boards’ resolution.34 
Furthermore, directors exceed their managerial free-
dom if violating industry standards grossly. For ex-
ample, bank directors do not act inside the BJR’s lee-
way if granting loans without collateral security or 
examining the debtor’s creditworthiness.35
Additionally, it is worth mentioning that any 
cost-benefit justification for law-breaking is pro-
hibited. Disobedience of the law cannot be justi-
fied even though the illegal action taken was to the 
company’s benefit.36
b No Extraneous Interests (“No Conflict of 
Interests”)37
When making business judgments, directors must 
be disinterested and independent as to the matter 
acted upon; they must not be guided by extraneous 
interests and, therefore, be free of any conflict of in-
terests.38 Torggler39 stressed out appropriately that in 
case of a conflict of interests the directors’ liability 
must not be restricted, “[…] because damages re-
sulting from pursuing other than the company’s in-
terests are not the realization of the company’s busi-
ness risks.” If, for example, an order is placed with 
the X-corporation, which is owned by the director 
himself or his wife, the director cannot be consid-
ered disinterested and independent regarding the deal 
and, therefore, it cannot be assumed that his business 
judgment was to the company’s sole benefit.40
34 LUTTER, M., 2007. Ibid, p. 81 f; German Supreme 
Court (BGH), 1. 12. 2003, II ZR 216/01. In: WM. 2004, 
468.
35 German Supreme Court (BGH), 3. 12. 2001, II ZR 
308/99. In: Wertpapiermitteilung. 2002, 220.
36 NOWOTNY, C. In: DORALT, P., NOWOTNY, C.; 
KALSS, S. Kommentar zum Aktiengesetz I2. 2012. § 84 
Rz 10; KALSS, S. In: GOETTE, W., HABERSACK, M. 
Münchener Kommentar zum Aktiengesetz II4. 2014. § 93 
Rz 350.
37 This BJR’s prerequisite is neither mentioned in the 
ARAG v. Garmenbeck decision nor in sec. 93 para. 1 d 
AktG, but found in the government’s reasoning for the 
Act on Corporate Integrity and Modernization of the Ri-
ght of Rescission (UMAG).
38 BRÖMMELMEYER, C. Neue Regeln für die Bin-
nenhaftung des Vorstands - Ein Beitrag zur Konkretisie-
rung der Business Judgment Rule. In: Wertpapiermittei-
lung. 2005, p. 2068; LUTTER, M., 2007. Ibid, p. 82. f 
with further references.
39 TORGGLER, H. Business Judgment Rule und unter-
nehmerische Ermessensentscheidungen. In: Zeitschrift 
für Europarecht, Internationales Privatrecht und Recht-
svergleichung. 2002, Vol. 4, p. 133 (p. 139).
40 LUTTER, M., 2007. Ibid, p. 83.
c Decision in the Best Interest of the Company
Furthermore, it is required that the directors could 
reasonably assume to act in the company’s best inter-
ests when taking an entrepreneurial decision. A rea-
sonable judgment is considered equivalent to acting 
in good faith.41 Therefore, directors must assess the 
risk of a business judgment and act in the belief that 
the decision taken was to the company’s benefit. Di-
rectors act in bad faith if the entrepreneurial decision 
taken is beyond the grounds of a reasonable judg-
ment and seems inexplicable on any other grounds.42
d Adequate Information
According to the BGH in ARAG v. Garmen-
beck, directors have to evaluate and ground their 
decisions “on every information available, whether 
by law or fact.” This may not be taken literally; it 
is sufficient to obtain adequate information on the 
matter and its potential consequences.43 The acquisi-
tion of a foreign-based company obviously requires 
further and other information than hiring a junior 
manager. However, the decision which information 
to procure is an entrepreneurial one and thus con-
tains a certain leeway for directors too.44 Whether the 
information gathered was adequate has to be evalu-
ated on a case-by-case basis taking time constraints, 
th matter’s complexity and the decision’s commer-
cial significance into consideration.
e No Irresponsible Hazard
Finally, to act with due care directors must not 
take any irresponsible risk threatening the com-
pany’s very existence.45 Accepting such risks, even 
when the decision is taken in good faith and grounded 
41 GASSER, J. Die Business Judgment Rule in Liech-
tenstein. In: Die Privatstiftung. 2011, Vol. 62, p. 71.
42 GRASS, A.R. Business Judgment Rule - Schranken 
der richterlichen Überprüfbarkeit von Management-
-Entscheidungen in aktienrechtlichen Verantwortlich-
keitsprozessen. Zürich: Schulthess, 1988, p. 64 ff.
43 SCHIMA, G., 2011. Ibid, p. 141.; KALSS, S. In: 
GOETTE, W.; HABERSACK, M., Münchener Ko-
mmentar zum Aktiengesetz II4. 2014. § 93 Rz 346.
44 BACHMANN, G. Reformbedarf bei der Business 
Judgment Rule? In: Zeitschrift für das gesamte Handels- 
und Wirtschaftsrecht. 2013, Vol. 177, p. 1. (1 f); BUNZ, 
T. Ist nur vollständige Information „angemessen“? An-
forderungen an den Grad der Informiertheit bei unter-
nehmerischen Entscheidungen. In: Der Konzern. 2012, 
Vol. 10, p. 444 (447 ff).
45 TORGGLER, H., 2002. Ibid, p. 136; LUTTER, M., 
2007. Ibid, p. 85, with further references.
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on adequate information, violates the directors’ duty 
to manage the company’s business affairs prudently.
3	 Codification	of	the	BJR
3.1 Legal Situation as of January 1st 2016
On January 1st 2016 the BJR was implemented by 
BGBl. I Nr. 112/2015 into the Austrian Limited Li-
ability Act (GmbHG) and the Austrian Stock Corpo-
ration Act (AktG),46 even though it has already partly 
been applied by courts and was acknowledged by the 
doctrine.47 However, the implementation was consid-
ered to be reasonable because it provides a guiding 
principle of how to act diligently and conscientious-
ly as director.48 Furthermore, the codification was 
praised for establishing a safe harbour for directors.49
To codify the BJR, the Austrian legislator intro-
duced sec. 25 para. 1a GmbHG and sec. 84 para. 1a 
AktG.50 The wording of these sections is orientated 
towards sec. 93 para. 1 dAktG51 and stipulates that 
executive board members are undoubtedly acting 
in accordance with the care of a diligent and con-
scientious businessman if, at the time of taking the 
entrepreneurial decision, they are not guided by 
extraneous interests and could reasonably assume 
to have acted on the basis of adequate information 
for the benefit of the company.52 If executive board 
members comply with these prerequisites they are 
in the BJR’s “safe harbour”, i.e. cannot be held per-
sonally liable. However, business decisions outside 
the scope of the BJR do not automatically indicate 
46 REICH-ROHRWIG, J.; ZIMMERMANN, A. 
Strafrechtsänderungsgesetz 2015 setzt die Business 
Judgment Rule um. In: ecolex. 2015, no. 8, p. 677.
47 Austrian Supreme Court (OGH), 08. 05. 2008, 6 
Ob 28/08y; OGH, 26. 02. 2002, 1 Ob 144/01k; OGH, 
22. 05. 2003, 8 Ob 262/02 s; OGH, 11. 06. 2008, 7 Ob 
58/08 t; OGH, 23. 05. 2007, 3 Ob 59/07h; STRASSER, 
R. In: JABORNEGG, P.; STRASSER, R. AktG II5. § 84 
AktG, Rz 98a; Schima, G., 2007. Ibid, p. 93 ff.
48 LUTTER, M., 2007. Ibid, p. 81.
49 728 der Beilagen zu den Stenographischen Protoko-
llen des Nationalrates XXV. GP, Bericht des Justizau-
sschusses, p. 7.
50 BGBl. I Nr. 22/2015.
51 The report of the Committee of Justice of the Aus-
trian Parliament (Justizausschussbericht) even refers ex-
plicitly to sec. 93 of the German Stock Corporation Act 
(dAktG); see 728 der Beilagen zu den Stenographischen 
Protokollen des Nationalrates XXV. GP, Bericht des Jus-
tizausschusses, p. 7.
52 Compare sec. 93 para. 1 dAktG.
a breach of duty or criminal conduct.53 Only the “safe 
harbour”-effect would be omitted.
Differing from sec. 93 para. 1 dAktG, the Austrian 
codification explicitly mentions that a prudent busi-
nessman must not be guided by extraneous interests 
when taking an entrepreneurial decision. Nonethe-
less, German courts of course respect that the BJR 
is not applicable if directors are not disinterested and 
independent as to the matter acted upon.54 However, 
the Austrian legislator wanted to implement all ele-
ments of the BJR in the law.
Eventually, it must be noted that according to the 
report of the Committee of Justice the BJR shall also 
apply to supervisory board members and other per-
sons who take business decision in their functions.55
3.2 Burden of Proof
One of the most relevant aspects in duty of care 
disputes is the allocation of burden of proof. As men-
tioned above, the US BJR is the legal “presumption 
that in making a business decision the directors of 
a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good 
faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was 
in the best interest of the company.”56 If the plaintiff 
is not able to rebut this presumption, US courts will 
only test the irrationality of the entrepreneurial deci-
sion.57 Because irrationality is the outer limit of the 
BJR, 58 the court will dismiss the case if the decision 
can be attributed to any rational business purpose.
Unlike the US, the burden of proof is regulated 
differently in Austrian law:
If the company claims damages from directors, 
the respective entrepreneurial decision is assessed 
by using a specific standard of due care. This stan-
dard of due care is provided in sec. 84 para. 1 AktG. 
Directors who violate their duties shall be liable to 
the company for any damages caused. However, 
regarding the burden of proof sec. 84 para. 2 AktG 
states that directors will not be held liable if they 
53 728 der Beilagen zu den Stenographischen Protoko-
llen des Nationalrates XXV. GP, Bericht des Justizau-
sschusses, p. 7.
54 BRÖMMELMEYER, C., 2005. Ibid, p. 2068; HOPT, 
K.; ROTH, M. In: Großkomm AktG5. § 93 Rz 90; SPIN-
DLER, G. In: GOETTE, W.; HABERSACK, M., Mün-
chKomm AktG4. § 93 Rz 60 ff.
55 728 der Beilagen zu den Stenographischen Protoko-
llen des Nationalrates XXV. GP, Bericht des Justizau-
sschusses, p. 12.
56 Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A. 2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984).
57 TOLD, J., 2015. Ibid, p. 61.
58 Annual Review of Developments in Business and 
Corporate Litigation, 2005 Edition, Committee on Bu-
siness and Corporate Litigation, 603; Brehm v. Eisner, 
746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000).
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can prove the diligence and prudence of their busi-
ness decisions. The OGH and the doctrine interpret 
sec. 84 para. 2 AktG in the manner that the claiming 
company must prove the damage, the causal connec-
tion between the damage and the directors’ decision 
as well as circumstances indicating a breach of duty, 
while the executive board members must prove the 
legality of their business decisions.59 If the conduct 
or omission was unlawful, the executive board mem-
bers will not be held liable if they can prove their 
action taken was not at fault.60 The same applies by 
way of analogy to sec. 25 GmbHG.
Speaking of the burden of proof, the crucial point 
is whether it is upon the company to prove the direc-
tors’ lack of due care or upon the directors to justify 
their acting. Due to sec. 84 para. 2 AktG most experts 
hold the opinion that executive board members have 
to prove their compliance with the BJR.61 However, 
as a consequence of the BJR’s implementation in sec. 
84 para. 1a AktG the authors do not agree with this 
approach. According to the report of the Committee 
of Justice the Austrian BJR is supposed to embody 
a safe harbour for directors. If the BJR shall fulfill its 
purpose as to protect directors under the aforemen-
tioned circumstances it is necessary to allocate the 
burden of proof differently:
The OGH rules that the company has to prove 
circumstances indicating the directors’ lack of due 
care.62 However, if sec 84. para 1a shall not be de-
prived of its safe harbour effect, the OGH’s approach 
has to be interpreted in the manner that the compa-
ny, in a first step, must prove that executive board 
members did not comply with at least one of the 
BJR’s prerequisites.63 Having done so, the respec-
tive entrepreneurial decision will be assessed using 
the standard of due care according to sec. 84 para. 1 
AktG. Executive board members then have to prove, 
in a second step, that the decision taken was not un-
lawful and their conduct not at fault. Otherwise the 
59 Austrian Supreme Court (OGH), 24. 06. 1998, 3 
Ob 34/97i; OGH, 14. 01. 2000, 1 Ob 228/99 g; OGH, 
22. 10. 2003, 3 Ob 287/02f; OGH, 19. 03. 2013, 9 
ObA 135/12 m; TORGGLER, U., 2002. Ibid, p. 136 
f; NOWOTNY, C. In: DORALT, P.; NOWOTNY, C.; 
KALSS, S. AktG2. § 84, Rz 27; However, according to 
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BJR’s implementation could only be considered as 
a determination of the standard of due care, without 
any impact on the current legal situation. Though, 
this would not correspond with the Austrian legisla-
tor’s intention to create a safe harbour.64
4	 Conclusion
The BJR is rooted in US company law and de-
scribed as “presumption that in making a business 
decision the directors of a corporation acted on an in-
formed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief 
that the action taken was in the best interests of the 
company.” It is upon the plaintiff to establish facts 
rebutting the presumption.
The legal situation in Austria is different. On Jan-
uary 1st 2016 the BJR was implemented in sec. 25 
para. 1a Austrian Limited Liability Act (GmbHG) 
and sec. 84 para. 1a Austrian Stock Corporation Act 
(AktG), even though it has already been applied by 
courts and was acknowledged by the doctrine. Unlike 
the US, Austrian courts and the doctrine represent the 
opinion that it is upon the directors to prove having 
complied with the BJR. Unfortunately, the codifica-
tion did not explicitly implement the US BJR’s pro-
cedural aspects, namely shifting the burden of proof 
to the plaintiff.
However, to satisfy the legislator’s intention 
to establish a safe harbour for directors the burden 
of proof must be allocated differently. Only if the 
company proves that executive board members did 
not comply with at least one of the BJR’s prerequi-
sites (sec. 84 para. 1a AktG), it is upon the directors 
to prove having acted with due care (sec. 84 para. 1).
64 728 der Beilagen zu den Stenographischen Protoko-
llen des Nationalrates XXV. GP, Bericht des Justizau-
sschusses, p. 7.
